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                       I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Hydraulic fracturing, or “hydrofracking,” describes the process 
wherein fluid is pumped underground at extremely high pressure to 
drive out oil or natural gas.1 Although first developed in the 1940s, 
hydrofracking did not begin to revolutionize the U.S. energy-
extraction industry until 1998, when, for the first time, it was used in 
conjunction with horizontal drilling.2 This combination of 
technologies provided for resource extraction from previously 
uneconomical shale basins—dubbed “unconventional” reserves3—
prompting a rapid proliferation in the number of natural gas wells 
constructed across the United States.4 For example, in Pennsylvania’s 
Marcellus shale formation alone, 196 wells were drilled in 2008, 763 in 
2009,5 1,386 in 2010,6 and an astronomical 3,500 are projected by 
 
        †       Adam Garmezy is a J.D. Candidate in the Class of 2014 at Duke University School of 
Law; B.A., Amherst College, magna cum laude, 2011. He would like to thank his friends for 
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 1.  Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas 
Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 115 (2009). 
 2.  The first coupling of hydrofracking and horizontal drilling occurred in 1998 in Texas’s 
Barnett Shale play. PHILIPPE A. CHARLEZ, ROCK MECHANICS: PETROLEUM APPLICATIONS 
239 (Editions Technip, 2d ed. 1997). See also Emily C. Powers, Fracking and Federalism: 
Support for an Adaptive Approach that Avoids the Tragedy of the Regulatory Commons, 19 J.L. 
& POL’Y 913, 919 (2011). 
 3.  Sarah K. Adair et al., Considering Shale Gas Extraction in North Carolina: Lessons 
from Other States, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 257, 261 (2012). 
 4.  William J. Sutherland et al., Horizon Scan of Global Conservation Issues for 2011, 26 
TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 10, 14 (2011). 
 5.  Kara Brasier & Melissa Ward, Accelerating Activity in the Marcellus Shale: An Update 
on Wells Drilled and Permitted, PENN. ST. COLL. AGRIC. SCI: PENN. ST. EXTENSION (May 16, 
2010), http://extension.psu.edu/naturalgas/news/2010/05/accelerating-activity. 
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2020.7 The practice of hydraulic fracturing is expanding so hurriedly 
that even residents of urbanized areas are subject to the possibility of 
“twenty-four hour drilling disrupting the tranquility” of their 
backyards.8 
Currently, a schism exists between energy lobbyists: one extreme 
believes that natural gas provides the key to America’s energy future; 
the other clamors that hydrofracking should be completely eradicated 
because of its potential to cause environmental degradation. Because 
of America’s increasing demand for energy, policymakers need to 
find a middle ground, allowing for increased energy production while 
minimizing environmental risk. This paper argues that the federal 
government is the best entity to govern this tension between 
increasing extraction and environmental protectionism. 
Part II provides a brief technical description of hydrofracking. 
Part III reviews the historical evolution of hydrofracking law in an 
effort to better frame the current state of energy policy. Part IV 
explores the environmental concerns associated with hydrofracking; 
Part V evaluates its economic benefits. Lastly, Part VI argues for a 
comprehensive, federal regulatory baseline to govern hydraulic-
fracturing policy, supplemented by local rights that can extend 
beyond this baseline. 
II. WHAT IS HYDROFRACKING? 
Hydrofracking has revolutionized the energy industry by 
allowing drillers to reach previously inaccessible oil and gas deposits.9 
Using the coupling of hydrofracking and horizontal drilling, widely 
dispersed oil and gas reserves can be extracted from tight, low-
 
 6.  Marcellus Shale–Appalachian Basin Natural Gas Play: New Research Results Surprise 
Everyone on the Potential of this Well-Known Devonian Black Shale, GEOLOGY.COM, 
http://geology.com/articles/marcellus-shale.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2013). 
 7.  Sutherland, supra note 4, at 14. 
 8. Timothy Riley, Wrangling with Urban Wildcatters: Defending Texas Municipal Oil and 
Gas Development Ordinances Against Regulatory Takings Challenges, 32 VT. L. REV. 349, 354 
(2007). In the Barnett Shale region of Texas, new homeowners often purchase property without 
being cognizant of the fact that drilling companies can re-enter their property and re-stimulate 
the well for production. The “core area” of the Barnett formation, the Newark East Field, lies 
beneath the densely populated Wise, Denton, Tarrant, and Dallas counties. Id. 
 9.  Jason Obold, Leading by Example: The Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of 
Chemicals Act of 2011 as a Catalyst for International Drilling Reform, 23 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 473, 475–76 (2012). In 2008, the Texas Supreme Court noted that “[t]he success of 
the Barnett Shale production zone has spurred efforts to produce gas in many other areas and 
geological formulations that were previously considered unrecoverable or uneconomic.” Coastal 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 32 (Tex. 2008) (citation omitted). 
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permeability geologic areas.10 Fluid cocktails are injected into the 
subsurface at extremely high pressures, which causes the already-
existing fracture networks to expand and also creates new fissures. 
This expanded fracture network gives previously trapped 
hydrocarbons an avenue to reach the wellbore.11 The contents of the 
fluid cocktail differ depending upon the precise geology of the area 
and the hydrocarbon to be extracted, but water and sand are two 
primary ingredients for any given fracturing operation, and are 
usually supplemented by various solvents, including hydrochloric acid 
or diesel fuel.12 
The process of injecting the fracking fluid stimulates the cracking 
of the subsurface geology. Next, the sand (or a similar substance) 
flows into the cracks and props them open—the substance, when used 
in this way, is referred to as a “proppant”13—providing a longer 
duration for the desired hydrocarbon to reach the wellbore.14 
Approximately nine to thirty-five percent of the fracking fluid flows 
back up the wellbore—referred to as the “flowback”—for around two 
weeks after the initial fracturing.15 The rest of the fracking fluid 
remains in the earth’s subsurface.16 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF HYDROFRACKING LAW AND POLICY 
A. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the “Halliburton Loophole”17 
The Energy Policy Act of 200518 exempted hydrofracking from 
the majority of the existing environmental regulatory framework.19 
 
 10. Wiseman, supra note 1, at 122. 
 11.  Obold, supra note 9, at 478. 
 12. Wiseman, supra note 1, at 118. 
 13.  Id. Proppants are “granular substances injected into the formation to hold or ‘prop’ 
open coal formation fractures,” typically sand. OFFICE OF GROUND WATER & DRINKING 
WATER, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF 
DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS 4-1 
(2004), available at http://fracfocus.org/sites/default/files/publications/evaluation_of_impacts_to_ 
underground_sources_of_drinking_water_by_hydraulic_fracturing_of_coalbed_methane_reserv
oirs.pdf. 
 14.  Wiseman, supra note 1, at 118–19. 
 15.  Powers, supra note 2, at 920. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Elisabeth N. Radow, Homeowners and Gas Drilling Leases: Boon or Bust?, 83 N.Y. ST. 
B.J. 10, 12 (2011) (explaining that the exemption from federal environmental regulation for 
hydrofracking is “commonly known as the Halliburton loophole”). 
 18.  Energy Policy Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-58, 119 STAT. 594 (2005). 
 19.  Powers, supra note 2, at 938–39. 
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Congress stated that the hydrofracking exemption would increase the 
country’s potential to reach the goal of energy independence,20 but 
critics remain skeptical as to the legislature’s true motivation for the 
exemptions.21 In fact, the skepticism regarding the exemptions for 
hydrofracking was so pervasive that certain “dubious provisions” in 
the 2005 Energy Policy Act became known as the “Halliburton 
loophole.”22 
President George W. Bush created the National Energy Policy 
Development Group less than three weeks after taking office, and 
appointed Vice President Dick Cheney to chair the task force.23 The 
group held dozens of meetings discussing energy policy, only one of 
which involved the participation of environmental interest groups.24 
Its ultimate recommendations “were greatly influenced, [and] often 
directly drafted, by [the oil and gas] industry.”25 Emails revealed that 
the group “adopted verbatim” numerous American Petroleum 
Institute (API) suggestions.26 These heavily industry-influenced 
recommendations, coming from the National Energy Policy 
Development Group, formed the basis for the Energy Policy Act of 
2005, fostering the skepticism previously mentioned.27 
Section 322 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 amended the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA)—which purports to protect public 
water supplies from hazardous substances and underground 
injection—to exclude “the underground injection of natural gas for 
purposes of storage”28 and “the underground injection of fluids or 
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See, e.g., Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2009, at A28 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/opinion/03tue3.html?scp=1&sq=halliburton+ 
loophole&st=nyt (noting that one of the provisions in the 2005 Energy Act was “dubbed the 
Halliburton Loophole”). 
 22.  See id. (claiming that the “dubious provisions” were “inserted at the behest of—you 
guessed it—then-Vice President Dick Cheney, a former chief executive of Halliburton”). On 
March 17, 1949, the first two commercial hydrofracking jobs were performed by Halliburton. 
Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic Fracturing: History of an Enduring 
Technology, 62 J. PETROLEUM TECH. 26, 27 (2010), available at http://www.spe.org/jpt/print/ 
archives/2010/12/10Hydraulic.pdf. 
 23.  Obold, supra note 9, at 483. The group was dominated by the energy industry, with the 
primary members coming from energy companies such as Exxon, Enron, and lobbyists from the 
American Petroleum Institute. Eric Dannenmaier, Executive Exclusion and the Cloistering of 
the Cheney Energy Task Force, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 329, 331 (2008). 
 24.  Dannenmaier, supra note 23, at 331. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Obold, supra note 9, at 483–84. 
 28.  42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
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propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic 
fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production 
activities.”29 Section 322 overturned an opinion in which the Eleventh 
Circuit held that Part C of the SDWA required the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate hydraulic fracturing activities.30 
Additionally, the Energy Policy Act “effectively exempted wellpad 
construction activities associated with hydrofracking from the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) under 
the [Clean Water Act],”31 because the CWA exempts “[s]tormwater 
runoff from oil, gas, and mining operations” from permitting 
requirements.32 
Because many states choose not to regulate hydrofracking 
pursuant to the SDWA even when diesel is used in the fracking fluid, 
the SDWA fails to provide any meaningful environmental protection 
for fracturing operations in much of the United States.33 However, in 
2003, BJ Services Co., Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., and 
Schlumberger Technology Corp. voluntarily agreed with the EPA to 
remove diesel fuel from the fracturing fluids “injected into coalbed 
methane production wells in underground sources of drinking water,” 
but did not agree to remove diesel fuel from other operations.34 
Even before Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
hydrofracking was exempt from the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA),35 which regulates hazardous-waste disposal, 
and from reporting requirements for toxic substances pursuant to the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 
 
 29.  42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
 30.  Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 118 F.3d 1467, 1478 
(11th Cir. 1997). 
 31.  Powers, supra note 2, at 939. 
 32.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2) (2006). 
 33.  For example, “regulations applicable in Louisiana (like those in most states) have 
never been used to regulate fracturing, even when the fracking fluid contains diesel.” Keith B. 
Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: What are the Legal Issues?, 59 LA. B.J. 250, 251 (2012). 
 34.  Rebecca Jo Reser & David T. Ritter, State and Federal Legislation and Regulation of 
Hydraulic Fracturing, 57 ADVOC. (TEX.) 31, 31 (2011), available at 
http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/Advocate_Vol57_Winter2011.pdf. 
 35.  42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (2006) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of 
this subsection, drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated with the 
exploration, development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or geothermal energy shall 
be subject only to existing State or Federal regulatory programs in lieu of this subchapter.”). 
The EPA then fully exempted wastes associated with the production of crude oil, natural gas, 
and geothermal energy in 1988. Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal 
Exploration, Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446, 25,447 (July 6, 1988) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (2010)). 
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(EPCRA).36 In addition, the EPA “will not aggregate air emissions 
from the various operations that occur on a wellpad, and the agency 
has exempted pollutants emitted by surface waste, like fracking fluid, 
from stationary source regulation” under the Clean Air Act (CAA).37 
With these numerous environmental exemptions, and with 
technological advances allowing for more efficient production, the 
United States has witnessed an explosion of hydrofracking: 
production of natural gas was level between 1996 and 2006, but once 
“fracking suddenly caught on . . . output has climbed steadily.”38 
B. Current Federal Oversight of Hydrofracking 
Even with hydrofracking’s widespread environmental 
exemptions,39 it does not completely escape federal oversight. For 
example, states still must comply with the CWA’s water-quality 
standards, and they still must satisfy the CAA’s national ambient air 
quality standards.40  
Specifically, the CWA provides federal oversight for the disposal 
of wastewater through sewer systems of publicly owned treatment 
facilities, as these mechanisms for disposal are “navigable waters” of 
the United States.41 However, the Supreme Court’s current 
understanding of “navigable waterways,” opined in Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Rapanos v. United States,42 dictates that jurisdiction 
under the CWA only arises if a “significant nexus” exists between 
federal navigable waters and an affected groundwater connection.43 
Because most of hydrofracking’s probable impacts on groundwater 
are hard to trace to navigable waters—it is currently very difficult to 
assess the amount and direction that the fracking fluid travels within 
 
 36.  Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21 VILL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 229, 250 n.125 (2010). 
 37.  Powers, supra note 2, at 940–41. 
 38.  Mark Perry, U.S. Natural Gas Production Hits All-Time High, REAL CLEAR ENERGY 
(July 5, 2011), http://www.realclearenergy.org/articles/2011/07/05/us_natural_gas_production_ 
at_all_time_high_106236.html. Additionally, although Mark Perry does not point to this 
correlation, it is important to note hydrofracking’s rapid increase beginning in 2006 and the 
passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
 39.  See supra text accompanying notes 18–38. 
 40.  Powers, supra note 2, at 940. 
 41.  See Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 32. 
 42.  547 U.S. 715, 759 (2006). 
 43.  Powers, supra note 2, at 940. 
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the subsurface—satisfying the “significant nexus” requirement for the 
underground injection of fluids is nearly impossible.44 
Even though hydrofracking is exempted from the definition of 
“underground injection” within the SDWA,45 § 1431(a) provides the 
EPA with authority to “take such actions [deemed to be] necessary in 
order to protect [public] health . . . [n]otwithstanding any other 
provision[s] of this subchapter,” which includes hydrofracking’s 
explicit exemptions specified in 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B).46 For 
example, § 1431(a) permits the EPA to compel companies to provide 
a potable water replacement for those possessing polluted personal 
water wells, to install explosivity meters, to mandate the surveying 
and sampling of all domestic wells within a circumscribed area, to 
take soil samples, and to eliminate gas flow pathways that could reach 
aquifers or other potential water supplies.47 
For air quality, EPA’s regulation of fracking is rooted in the 2010 
consent decree resulting from WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson.48 That 
decree, issued by the D.C. Circuit, required the EPA to regulate air 
emissions of oil and gas facilities “under CAA section 112(f)(2)” by 
January 31, 2011.49 Pursuant to the court’s holding, the EPA is 
requiring new source performance standards for volatile organic 
compounds and sulfur dioxide for new and existing wells.50 
Additionally, the EPA is suggesting that for natural gas processing 
plant valves, there should be a tightening of what constitutes a 
“leak.”51  
Although the EPA is currently working on a framework of 
federal permitting guidelines for fracking operations using diesel 
fuels,52 the oil and gas industry has indicated that they may contest 
 
 44.  Id. at 940 n.169. 
 45.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B) (excluding from the definition of underground injection 
“the underground injection of natural gas for purposes of storage” and “the underground 
injection of fluids or propping agents . . . pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations”). 
 46.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (2006) (excluding “the underground injection of natural gas for 
purposes of storage” and “the underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than 
diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations . . .”). 
 47.  See Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 35–36 (discussing the EPA’s rights under the 
SDWA). 
 48.  Consent Decree, WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson, Case 1:09-cv-00089-CK (D.D.C. 
Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.jacksonkelly.com/jk/pdf/C2110376.PDF. 
 49.  Id. at 3–4. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  The EPA has authority to regulate underground injection of diesel pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
Garmezy (Do Not Delete) 5/7/2013 11:16 AM 
412 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIII:405 
future EPA regulations for being “overly broad.”53 Likewise, some 
states, such as North Dakota, have expressed concerns that EPA’s 
forthcoming rules might overburden states and provide an 
impediment to the thriving natural gas economy, and have indicated 
that they might bring suit if the EPA finalizes the regulations.54 North 
Dakota’s reaction to potential federal oversight is indicative of 
current regulation of hydrofracking in many states throughout the 
country—big oil and gas companies drill with minimal environmental 
regulations,55 and widespread industry opposition will render 
meaningful change deeply challenging. 
C. Major Proposed Federal Legislation: The FRAC Act 
In response to growing concerns about the environmental 
impacts of fracking and increasing public awareness of the lack of 
regulatory oversight governing hydrofracking,56 in 2009 the Fracturing 
Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act (FRAC Act) was 
proposed for debate in both the House of Representatives57 and the 
Senate.58 The bill was reintroduced in 2011, again in both the House59 
and Senate,60 but Congress has yet to act affirmatively on the 
proposal.61 The FRAC Act would overhaul the current regulatory 
scheme overseeing hydrofracking by repealing its exemption in the 
 
 53.  Sorrell E. Negro, Fracking Wars: Federal, State and Local Conflicts over the Regulation 
of Natural Gas Activities, ZONING & PLAN L. REP. Feb. 2012, at 1, 2. 
 54.  North Dakota’s particular concern is federal regulation that would require permitting 
for petroleum distillates that make-up less than one-percent of fracking fluid used in the Bakken 
oil shale in western North Dakota. North Dakota Eyes Suit if EPA Pursues Broad Definition of 
Diesel Fracking, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY REPORT, Nov. 11, 2011, at 30. 
 55.  See infra Part VI. 
 56.  Television shows, documentaries such as Gasland, dramatized cinema such as the 
impending “Promised Land,” and newspaper articles have begun to publically broadcast the 
environmental concerns with hydrofracking. See, e.g., Matt Damon Fracking Film Lights Up 
Petroleum Lobby, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/video/video.aspx?vid=Matt-Damon-
Fracking-Film-Lights-Up-Petroleum-Lobby-5jac00046 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). 
 57.  Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2009, H.R. 2766, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
 58.  Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals (FRAC) Act, S. 1215, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
 59.  Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011, H.R. 1084, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
 60.  FRAC Act, S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 61.  The bill in the House and Senate has the status of “Died (Referred to Committee)” as 
of November 20, 2012. Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011, H.R. 
1084, 112th Cong. (as introduced by House, Mar. 15, 2011); FRAC Act, S. 587 112th Cong. (as 
introduced by Senate, Mar. 15, 2011). 
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SDWA and by requiring disclosure of fracturing chemicals.62 This 
change would require the EPA to undertake the “inspection, 
monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements” pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 330h(b)(1)(c), which would require all drillers to prove 
that their fracking fluids will not endanger potable water supplies 
before they could obtain an Underground Injection Control permit 
and begin their fracturing job.63 
The disclosure portion of the FRAC Act would require 
distributing to the public a list of the “chemical constituents” used in 
fracking fluid, but not the proportions used, as those are considered 
“proprietary chemical formulas.”64 If necessary during a public-health 
emergency, even the proprietary formulas would have to be disclosed 
(though not to the public).65 The oil and gas lobby, fearful that the 
leaking of their trade secrets and proprietary information will 
diminish profits, have vehemently opposed the FRAC Act.66 
IV. MAJOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS WITH HYDROFRACKING 
Questions regarding hydrofracking’s environmental impacts have 
begun to radiate throughout the country, and many lawsuits over 
those impacts—particularly over water contamination—have been 
filed, asserting common law tort claims.67 These growing 
environmental concerns are driving some states to impose 
moratoriums on fracking pending further research on its 
 
 62.  Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 33. The bills propose including “the underground 
injection of fluids or propping agents pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, 
gas, or geothermal production activities” within the definition of “underground injection” in the 
SDWA. H.R. 1084, § 2(a); S. 587, § 2(a). 
 63.  Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 33. 
 64.  H.R. 1084, § 2(b); S. 587, § 2(b). 
 65.  “Whenever the State or the Administrator, or a treating physician or nurse, determines 
that a medical emergency exists and the proprietary chemical formula of a chemical used in 
hydraulic fracturing operations is necessary for medical treatment, the person conducting the 
hydraulic operations shall, upon request, immediately disclose the proprietary chemical 
formulas or the specific chemical identity of a trade secret chemical to the State, the 
Administrator or treating physician.” H. R. 1084, § 2(b); S. 587, § 2(b). 
 66.  During 2009 and 2010 Energy in Depth, an oil and gas group backed by “some of the 
largest oil companies on the planet, such as Chevron, BP, Shell, and Occidental, along with the 
American Petroleum Institute and other trade associations” spent $126.8 million on lobbying. 
Big Oil Front Group Poured Millions into Lobby Against Fracking Regulation, 
POLLUTERWATCH (Feb. 18, 2011, 8:45 AM), http://www.polluterwatch.com/blog/big-oil-front-
group-poured-millions-lobby-against-fracking-regulation. 
 67.  Joe Schremmer, Comment, Avoidable “Fraccident”: An Argument Against Strict 
Liability for Hydraulic Fracturing, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 1215, 1216–17 (2012). 
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environmental impacts,68 and driving countries such as France, 
Switzerland, and South Africa to enact nationwide hydrofracking 
bans.69 This section will provide an overview of the most prominent 
environmental concerns related to hydrofracking: water 
contamination; water usage; greenhouse-gas emissions; seismic 
disturbance; and the loss of pristine wilderness. 
A. Water Contamination 
In 2004, the EPA “concluded that the injection of hydraulic 
fracturing fluids into coalbed methane wells pose[d] little or no 
threat” to underground sources of drinking water.70 However, because 
most formations fracture vertically, chemical leakage from 
hydrocarbon formations to above aquifers remains a major concern 
notwithstanding the EPA’s 2004 findings.71 Furthermore, although 
approximately nine to thirty-five percent of the fracking flowback 
returns to the wellbore, the rest remains buried within the earth’s 
subsurface,72 leading to concern that the flowback could move toward 
the surface, through either well-casing cracks or fissures in the rock, 
and contaminate local groundwater reserves and consequently, 
drinking water supply.73 
The EPA announced that this risk of groundwater contamination 
is minimal because fracking fluid contains only a small concentration 
of toxic chemicals, effective fluid-recovery techniques can reduce the 
amount of fracking fluid left underground, and the rock surrounding 
the fractures can absorb much of what remains.74 The shale strata is 
believed to act as an effective barrier to fluid migration because shale 
formations have low permeability,75 and there is typically over a 
vertical mile of rock sitting between the horizontal fracturing zone 
 
 68.  For example, New York has a moratorium on fracking near the New York City and 
Syracuse watersheds, New Jersey has imposed a moratorium on hydrofracking throughout the 
state, and Maryland instituted a three-year moratorium. Negro, supra note 53, at 9. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Schremmer, supra note 67, at 1224. 
 71.  Id. at 1221. 
 72.  Powers, supra note 2, at 920. 
 73.  See id. (writing that “[t]he rest remains below the earth’s surface and has the potential 
to move through cracks in well casings or the target substrate into surrounding rock and 
eventually to migrate into and contaminate groundwater sources for waterways and drinking 
supplies”). 
 74.  Schremmer, supra note 67, at 1221–22. 
 75.  See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at ES-17 (“The low permeability of 
relatively unfractured shale . . .”). 
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and the aquifers above.76 Even the fact that shale “must be 
hydraulically fractured to produce fluids” has been proffered as 
evidence that migration is not a major concern.77  
The apprehension over the large proportion of the flowback 
remaining nestled underground is somewhat abated by the unique 
chemical properties of shale, as shale is generally chemically reactive 
with high water-content fluids.78 Over-time, when the water contacts 
the shale, the two substances form a viscous slurry that eventually is 
believed to seal the fissures within the rocks, inhibiting flowback 
migration.79 However, because the fissures are not sealed 
instantaneously, an avenue still exists for the fracking fluid to flow 
toward the surface via any vertical fissures. In geologic regions with 
thinner shale beds, water contamination would seem to be more 
likely. 
A 2011 study conducted by the Nicholas School for the 
Environment at Duke University found “no evidence of 
contamination from chemical-laden fracking fluids.”80 Nevertheless, 
methane levels were “17 times higher on average in wells located 
within a kilometer of active hydrofracking sites,” and the methane 
observed at these wells was of the type that is indicative of methane 
formed at high temperature and pressure deep underground—the 
methane typically released by drilling and hydrofracking operations.81 
Although it is important to realize that the data only exhibits a 
sizeable correlation, the study strongly suggests that drilling and 
hydrofracking contributes to water contamination, albeit not from the 
fracking fluids themselves. 
 
 76.  Schremmer, supra note 67, at 1222. 
 77. See Sy Gruza, Will NYSDEC’s Proposed Regulations Prevent the Potential Significant 
Adverse Impacts of Fracking?, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,331, 10,334 (2012) 
(“The fact that the shales must be hydraulically fractured to produce fluids is evidence that 
these rocks do not readily transmit fluid.”). 
 78.  Schremmer, supra note 67, at 1222. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Tim Lucas, Methane Levels 17 Times Higher in Water Wells Near Hydrofracking Sites, 
NICHOLAS SCH. OF THE ENV’T (May 9, 2011), http://www.nicholas.duke.edu/ 
hydrofracking/methane-levels-17-times-higher-in-water-wells-near-hydrofracking-sites. 
 81.  Id. Wells closer to active hydrofracking sites “had a different isotopic footprint,” and 
were made up of thermogenic methane, “which is formed at high temperatures deep 
underground and is captured in gas wells during hydrofracking” as opposed to biogenic 
methane, which is not associated with hydrofracking and “is produced at shallower depths and 
lower temperatures.” Id. 
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In 2011, pursuant to CERCLA § 104(e),82 which authorizes the 
EPA to monitor hydrofracking operations because of the 
nonpetroleum-based fluids used in the fracking fluid,83 the EPA 
decided it was time to reinvestigate the connection between water 
contamination and hydrofracking.84 The EPA inspected the alleged 
groundwater contamination in the Pavillion Gas Field of Wyoming, 
and published a draft report of its findings85 (a final report is not 
expected until 2014).86 The EPA findings differed dramatically from 
their 2004 conclusions.87 
The 2011 draft concluded that “inorganic and organic 
constituents associated with hydraulic fracturing have contaminated 
ground water at and below the depth used for [the] domestic water 
supply.”88 This conclusion was tempered somewhat by the distinctive 
geology of the Pavillion Gas Field, which consists of “thin 
discontinuous sandstone units” possessing “little lateral and vertical 
continuity to hydraulically fracture tight sandstones and no lithologic 
barrier (lateral continuous shale units) to stop upward vertical 
migration of aqueous constituents of hydraulic fracturing.”89 
Additionally, extending the casing below the “maximum depth of 
domestic wells in the area” and using more cement may help alleviate 
fluid migration.90 Nevertheless, residents living in the area of 
Pavillion, Wyoming were advised to avoid drinking from their wells 
 
 82. “Whenever the President is authorized to act pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, 
or whenever the President has reason to believe that a release has occurred or is about to occur, 
or that illness, disease, or complaints thereof may be attributable to exposure to a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, or contaminant and that a release may have occurred or be occurring, he 
may undertake such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other information 
gathering as he may deem necessary or appropriate to identify the existence and extent of the 
release or threat thereof, the source and nature of the hazardous substances, pollutants or 
contaminants involved . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1) (2005). 
 83.  Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 33. 
 84.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, No.600/D-11/001, DRAFT PLAN TO STUDY THE 
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES 1 
(2011). 
 85.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DRAFT INVESTIGATION OF GROUND WATER 
CONTAMINATION NEAR PAVILLION, WYOMING (2011) (responding to complaints made by well 
owners regarding drinking water contamination by conducting a study on the contributing 
factors of the contamination). 
 86.  Schremmer, supra note 67, at 1223. 
 87.  See supra text accompanying notes 70–94 (discussing the findings of the EPA). 
 88.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 85, at 39. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 38. 
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because of the hydrocarbons detected in the water supply.91 
Notwithstanding the EPA’s conclusion that hydrofracking was 
contributing to water pollution,92 Matt Mead, the governor of 
Wyoming at the time, delayed the release of the EPA’s findings so 
state officials and energy juggernauts93 could “coordinate an ‘all-out-
press’ against the EPA.”94 Wyoming’s response suggests that oil- and 
gas-rich states may prefer to be willfully blind, prioritizing the 
economic benefits of hydrofracking over open disclosure and safety. 
The risk of water-supply contamination is greater in regions with 
more “brittle” geology—rock formations already containing many 
faults and fractures that can “serve as conduits that facilitate 
migration of contaminants, methane, or pressurized fluids from deep 
formations towards the surface.”95 In water-rich states, where 
groundwater connections are widespread, migration is particularly 
problematic.96 For example, because of the particular geology of the 
Catskill region’s bedrock, hydrofracking in upstate New York could 
be highly dangerous to the New York City watershed.97 The Catskill 
region contains brittle geological features and in some areas, no 
vertical distance exists between New York’s water infrastructure and 
the Marcellus formation (the location of the gas to be extracted).98 
As discussed above, most of the water used during fracturing 
remains underground, and only about nine to thirty-five percent 
returns to the surface.99 Many states are struggling to dispose of the 
wastewater safely, and approaches vary by region. Although 
wastewater disposal is regulated nationally under the CWA and 
 
 91.  Negro, supra note 53, at 5. 
 92.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 85, at 39. 
 93.  See, e.g., Christopher Helman, Encana Calls B.S. on EPA’s Wyoming Gas Fracking 
Study, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/12/12/ 
encana-calls-b-s-on-epas-wyoming-gas-fracking-study/ (calling some of Encana Oil & Gas’s 
criticisms “downright funny in their suggestion that the agency bungled not just its testing 
approach, but the test samples themselves”). 
 94.  Wyoming Pushed EPA to Delay Study on Fracking: Report, REUTERS (May 3, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/03/us-usa-fracking-epa-idUSBRE8421K920120503. 
 95.  N.Y.C. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., FINAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT: IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT OF NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION IN THE NEW YORK CITY WATER SUPPLY 
WATERSHED 13 (2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/pdf/natural_gas_drilling/ 
12_23_2009_final_assessment_report.pdf. 
 96.  Powers, supra note 2, at 925. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  N.Y.C. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 95, at 13–20 (describing New York’s 
geological features). 
 99.  Powers, supra note 2, at 920. 
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SDWA, there are a wide array of methods that satisfy the national 
regulatory standard. In western states the common practice is to inject 
the flowback into underground reservoirs.100 Most eastern states do 
not have the proper geology for underground injection and cannot 
treat the waste at municipal treatment plants, so they often dispose of 
wastewater into lined pits or ponds.101 If not done properly, this can 
lead to surface pollution. Indeed, due to increasing amounts of 
wastewater in his state’s rivers, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett 
asked the EPA to develop federal regulations for “pretreating” 
wastewater.102 Likewise, wastewater pollution concerns led the New 
Jersey legislature to ban “the treatment or storage of fracking waste 
in the state,” though the bill was vetoed by Governor Chris Christie, 
who instead imposed a one-year moratorium on fracking to further 
study the issue.103 
It is important to note that groundwater contamination can also 
occur from poorly constructed domestic water wells.104 Because 
drinking-water wells are not subject to the same oversight and 
scrutiny as corporate operations, the casing on the water wells may 
not extend deeply enough to protect the water supply.105 These poorly 
designed wells can allow contaminated surface water to flow into the 
water well and pollute the entire underlying aquifer.106 More 
unexpectedly, older, undisclosed wells can contribute to surface 
pollution because when subterranean methane pockets are released, 
the methane can escape to the surface—which can even take the form 
of a weeklong, thirty-foot methane-laced geyser.107 Many water wells 
 
 100.  Negro, supra note 53, at 6. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 6–7. 
 103.  Mireya Navarro, New Jersey Senate Bans Treatment of Fracking Waste, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 25, 2012, 6:31 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/new-jersey-senate-bans-
treatment-of-fracking-waste/. 
 104.  ANTHONY ANDREWS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40894, UNCONVENTIONAL 
GAS SHALES: DEVELOPMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY ISSUES 26 (2009), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40894_20091030.pdf. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. “In such instances, and particularly where natural gas drilling and stimulation 
activities are nearby, leaky surface impoundments or careless surface disposal or drilling fluids 
at the natural gas operation could increase the risk of contaminating the nearby water well . . . “  
Id. 
 107.  Scott Detrow, Perilous Pathways: How Drilling Near an Abandoned Well Produced a 
Methane Geyser, NPR (Oct. 9, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/ 
2012/10/09/perilous-pathways-how-drilling-near-an-abandoned-well-produced-a-methane-
geyser/. 
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were created before permits were required, and therefore it is nearly 
impossible to be certain that a fracking site is completely well-free.108 
The risk of groundwater pollution is heightened because federal law 
exempts the construction or operation of oil and gas operations from 
the CWA, although states can regulate within this federal void.109 
B. The Large Quantity of Water Required for Hydrofracking 
Lower estimates publicize that two to four million gallons of 
water are required to fracture a horizontal well110 and higher estimates 
announce the number to be between four and eight million gallons.111 
The fact that wells can be fractured multiple times112 greatly increases 
the amount of water used at each drilling site. Even though 
hydrofracking uses millions of gallons of freshwater, its water 
consumption is relatively minimal compared with other activities. For 
example, in New York, fracking is estimated to consume 
approximately nine billions gallons of water a year—a small fraction 
of the 3.8 trillion total gallons of water used annually.113 However, as 
hydrofracking becomes more common, the strain on the water supply 
will rapidly become more significant.114 In the Barnett Shale play, 
water usage increased from approximately 700-acre-feet in 2000 to 
more than 7,000 acre-feet in 2005.115 
 
 108.  See id. (Over the last 150 years, “as many as 300,000 wells have been drilled, an 
unknown number of them left behind as hidden holes in the ground.”). 
 109.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2) (2006). For example, Pennsylvania requires a permit for 
“implementation of erosion and sedimentation controls, including storm water management.” 
ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 104, at 36. 
 110.  JACQUELYN PLESS, REGULATING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: STATES TAKE ACTION, 
3 (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/energy/FrackingPub1210.pdf. 
 111.  CHARLES W. ABDALLA & JOY R. DROHAN, PENN. ST. UNIV., WATER WITHDRAWALS 
FOR DEVELOPMENT OF MARCELLUS SHALE GAS IN PENNSYLVANIA: INTRODUCTION TO 
PENNSYLVANIA’S WATER RESOURCES 3 (2010). (“Hydrofracturing a horizontal Marcellus well 
may use 4 to 8 million gallons of water, typically within about 1 week. However, based on 
experiences in other major U.S. shale gas fields, some Marcellus wells may need to be 
hydrofractured several times over their productive life (typically five to twenty years or 
more).”). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,333. 
 114.  See, e.g., Michael Clark, Texas Struggles to Manage Hydrofracking Water Use, EARTH 
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.earthtimes.org/energy/texas-struggles-manage-
hydrofracking-water-use/1345/ (articulating that fracking in Texas “currently uses [12 billion] 
gallons of water per year and it is expected to climb to [39 billion] by 2030). 
 115.  ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 104, at 7. 
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Utilizing an additional two to eight million gallons of water116 in a 
brief period can strain existing infrastructure and threaten current 
water uses.117 Significant water withdrawals can also have negative 
effects on municipal water supplies, recreational activities, utilities 
dependent on flowing water, and aquatic life.118 Reduced stream flow, 
especially in times of drought, can cause degradation of carefully 
balanced natural habitats.119 Groundwater supplies can be affected 
too. For example, Louisiana’s Office of Conservation has received 
complaints from landowners that their wells are “going dry.”120 
Because of the growing concerns regarding the public water supply, 
some states have recently enacted requirements that companies 
provide proposals for water usage before receiving a permit to begin 
fracturing operations.121 
C. Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Because natural gas is cleaner burning than both coal and oil, 
hydrofracking supporters tout natural gas as a “bridge fuel,”122 and 
suggest that the cleaner emissions offset any negative environmental 
impacts. The combustion of natural gas emits nearly “two-thirds less 
carbon dioxide than coal and one-quarter less than oil when 
consumed in a typical electric power plant.”123 Furthermore, the 
combustion of natural gas “also emits less particulate matter, sulfur 
dioxide, and nitrogen dioxides” than both coal and oil.124 
However, natural gas may not have as strong an impact on the 
reduction of greenhouse emissions as previously thought. A 2011 
Cornell University study found that shale gas has a significantly larger 
greenhouse footprint than conventional gas because methane, a 
 
 116.  See supra text accompanying note 111. 
 117.  PLESS, supra note 110, at 3. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,333. 
 120.  Hall, supra note 33, at 251. 
 121.  For example, “Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality enacted a rule in 
2011 requiring gas companies to provide the proposed total volume of water needed for fracking 
operations, complete an online water withdrawal evaluation, and explain the source of their 
water before beginning extraction.” Negro, supra note 53, at 6. New York’s DEC regulates “the 
rate, timing, and location of water withdrawals through permit conditions.” Gruza, supra note 
77, at 10,333. 
 122.  MICHAEL RATNER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41543, GLOBAL NATURAL GAS: A 
GROWING RESOURCE 1 (2010), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41543_ 
20101222.pdf. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
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highly potent greenhouse gas, is emitted with the completion of a 
fracturing job.125 Methane is the chief component of natural gas, and 
methane’s global warming potential is “far greater” than that of CO2, 
especially in the decades following the gas’s release.126 In fact, over a 
twenty-year period, shale gas, while having fewer emissions due to the 
direct combustion, may have a larger greenhouse footprint than both 
coal and diesel oil because of fugitive methane.127 It is important to 
note that these conclusions have been disputed by other scholars at 
Cornell University for “overestimat[ing] the fugitive emissions 
associated with unconventional gas extraction.”128 
Nevertheless, recent greenhouse gas projections from the State 
Department forecast an eight percent increase in methane release 
between 2005 and 2020, with the greatest difference attributed to 
increases in fugitive methane from the natural gas sector.129 Currently, 
the “Business as Usual” projection shows steady increases in 
greenhouse gas emissions through 2050,130 but “shifts in the 
competitive relationship between natural gas and coal in electricity 
generation markets” could have large impacts on methane gas 
emissions (relatively larger in the natural gas sector) and carbon 
dioxide emissions (relatively larger in the coal sector).131 
D. Seismic Disturbance 
Structural geologists are concerned that the subsurface 
interference associated with hydrofracking could lead to earthquakes 
by triggering unintended seismic disturbances.132 Seismic disturbance 
is a larger concern in already seismically active areas and fault zones, 
as subsurface disruption in these areas is more likely to trigger 
earthquakes.133 Of even more concern, subsurface interference could 
 
 125.  Robert Howarth, Climate Impacts of Shale Gas Development, CORNELL UNIV. (Apr.. 
19, 2012), available at http://www.eeb.cornell.edu/howarth/Marcellus.html. 
 126.  Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 38. 
 127.  Howarth, supra note 125. See also Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 38. (“[T]he 
footprint of shale gas is at least 20% greater than coal, and perhaps more than twice as great on 
the 20-year horizon and is comparable to coal when compared over 100 years.”). 
 128.  Tim Boersma & Corey Johnson, The Shale Gas Revolution: U.S. and EU Policy and 
Research Agendas, 29 REV. POL’Y RES. 570, 573 (2012). 
 129.  U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 79 (2010). 
 130.  Id. at 77. 
 131.  Id. at 84. 
 132.  See Powers, supra note 2, at 925 (stating that “subsurface interference could . . . trigger 
earthquakes”). 
 133.  Eli MacKinnon, Strange Dallas Earthquakes Might be Caused by Fracking, MOTHER 
NATURE NETWORK (Oct. 2, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://www.mnn.com/earth-matters/energy/stories/ 
Garmezy (Do Not Delete) 5/7/2013 11:16 AM 
422 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIII:405 
fissure pre-existing subsurface-fault zones, allowing gas migration into 
aquifers.134 
According to Dr. Cliff Frohlich, a senior research scientist at the 
University of Texas’s Institute for Geophysics, “it is possible that 
some of these earthquakes have a natural origin . . . but it is 
implausible that all are natural,” as there has been a clustering of the 
earthquakes witnessed in the Barnett Shale region within two miles of 
disposal wells.135 The underground injection of wastewater is believed 
to be causing the newfound seismic activity.136 Before 2008, Dallas, 
which sits near the active drilling sites of the Barnett shale play, never 
recorded an earthquake stronger than a magnitude three, but the city 
has experienced an earthquake of this magnitude every subsequent 
year, with the exception of 2010.137 Arkansas has also recently 
witnessed an uptick in seismic activity, and because of the correlation 
witnessed between seismic activity and underground injection of 
wastewater, “the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission has imposed an 
emergency moratorium on the drilling of new injection wells . . . .”138 
E. Loss of Pristine Wilderness 
In 2011, New York’s Department of Environmental 
Conservation issued a Revised Draft Supplemental Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement,139 which stated that exposing 
environmentally sensitive areas to the potential adverse impacts of 
 
strange-dallas-earthquakes-might-be-caused-by-fracking (“Faults are everywhere. A lot of them 
are stuck, but if you pump water in there, it reduces friction and the fault slips a little.”); see 
Terrence Henry, How Fracking Disposal Wells are Causing Earthquakes in Dallas-Fort Worth¸ 
NPR (Aug. 6, 2012, 2:52 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/08/06/ how-fracking-
disposal-wells-are-causing-earthquakes-in-dallas-fort-worth/ (“The problem, according to the 
new study by Dr. Cliff Frohlich, senior research scientist at the University’s Institute for 
Geophysics, is that some of those disposal wells around Dallas-Fort Worth are also on fault 
lines.”). 
 134.  See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., supra note 95, at 13 (the fluids follow the “path of 
least resistance” and are “forced upward toward the surface”). 
 135.  Henry, supra note 133. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  MacKinnon, supra note 133. 
 138.  Campbell Robertson, Arkansas Quake is its Most Powerful in 35 Years, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 1, 2011),  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/us/01earthquakes.html?_%20r=1&hp&_ 
r=1&. 
 139.  See generally N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT 
SUPPLEMENTAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND 
SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM (2011), available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/data/dmn/ rdsgeisfull0911.pdf. 
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hydrofracking is one of “the most significant” possible impacts.140 As 
discussed above, the use of water for hydrofracking, especially if the 
practice becomes even more common,141 could disturb carefully 
balanced ecosystems by disrupting stream flow or lake storage.142 
Consequently, New York prohibits hydrofracking in the Forest 
Preserve land of the Adirondacks and Catskills.143 
When the EPA visited an operation in Colorado, researchers 
witnessed “areas where patches of grass and trees were turning brown 
and dying” in areas that “previously had prolonged normal soil 
conditions.”144 Improperly managed fracturing operations can 
exacerbate the problems created by surface pollution.145 For example 
in 2009, an operation in the Marcellus Shale, Pennsylvania, only 150 
miles northwest of New York City, sent nearly 8,000 gallons of 
fracking fluid into the wilderness because of failed pipe connections.146 
The fluid contained LGC-35 CBM, a potentially carcinogenic 
lubricant; although tests conducted by the Pennsylvania Department 
of Environmental Protection concluded that the concentration of the 
carcinogen was not high enough to be harmful.147 Conversely, private 
experimentation found that there were toxins in the drinking water, 
including ethylene glycol, propylene glycol, and toluene in the well 
water of “almost everybody” living in the area of the spill.148 A larger 
spill, or a spill with a higher concentration of dangerous chemicals, 
could be disastrous to the surrounding ecosystem and to human 
health. 
 
 140.  Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,333. 
 141.  See, e.g. Sutherland, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing the projected increase of wells in 
the Marcellus region). 
 142.  See supra text accompanying notes 117–121. 
 143.  See generally N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, supra note 139. 
 144.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND 
SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE 
RESERVOIRs, EPA 816R04003 App. A-2–4, A-11–14 (2004). 
 145.  See Obold, supra note 9, at 481 (stating that improperly managed fracking operations 
lead to surface pollution). 
 146.  Wes Deweese, Fracturing Misconceptions: A History of Effective State Regulation, 
Groundwater Protection, and the Ill-Conceived FRAC Act, 6 OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 49, 7 (2010), 
available at http://www.law.ou.edu/sites/default/files/files/FACULTY/2010okjoltrev49.pdf. 
 147.  See id. (stating that the “concentrations of the chemical in the fracturing fluid were 
found to be so diluted that they were harmless”). 
 148.  Toxic Fracking Chemicals Found in Pennsylvania Drinking Water, HERALD DISPATCH 
(Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/news/briefs/x1988164152/Toxic-fracking-
chemicals-found-in-Pennsylvania-drinking-water. 
Garmezy (Do Not Delete) 5/7/2013 11:16 AM 
424 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIII:405 
V. ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF HYDROFRACKING 
A. The Significance of Shale Gas 
A 2010 assessment of the world’s remaining energy supplies, 
conducted by the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural 
Resources and the German Mineral Resources Agency,149 concluded 
that approximately 406 billion tons of hydrocarbons remain that can 
be extracted with existing technology at an economically practicable 
cost.150 The International Energy Agency determined that, in 2009 
alone, 8.353 billion tons were used globally, and therefore, at this rate 
of consumption, current economically recoverable energy reserves 
would only last approximately forty-eight years.151 Seventy-one billion 
of the 406 billion tons of recoverable hydrocarbons are locked in 
unconventional reserves that require advanced drilling technologies 
such as hydrofracking.152 Domestically, “[n]atural gas consumption 
currently comprises about 23% of the total energy consumption,”153 
and possible increases in demand from retiring coal power plants154 
and increasing residential and industrial uses155 might increase natural 
gas’s importance in America’s energy framework. Without major 
technological advancements in renewable, alternative energy sources 
that would allow for the complete avoidance of unconventional 
hydrocarbon extraction, hydrofracking may be necessary as 




 149.  See generally FED. INST. FOR GEOSCIENCES & NAT. RES., ANNUAL REPORT, 
RESERVES, RESOURCES AND AVAILABILITY OF ENERGY RESOURCES 81, 86 (2010), available 
at http://www.bgr.bund.de/EN/Themen/Energie/Downloads/annual_report_2010_en.pdf?__blob 
=publicationFile&v=3. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Obold, supra note 9, at 475. 
 152.  See id. (writing that “unconventional hydrocarbons require more advanced drilling 
technologies both to reach the reserve and to pull the oil or gas to the surface”). 
 153.  Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,332. 
 154.  Some experts have “estimated that within 15 years coal might account for 35-40% of 
U.S. power generation compared to 48-50% today.” Jonathan Bailey & Henry Lee, North 
American Oil and Gas Reserves: Prospects and Policy, (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper 
No. 12-039, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148702 
&http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2148702. 
 155.  For example, see Matthew L. Wald, An Airline Fleet Fueled by Natural Gas, N.Y. 
TIMES BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012, 10:44 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/an-airline-
fleet-fueled-by-natural-gas/, for an article about Qatar Airlines opening an airport that will 
pump airline fuel derived from natural gas. 
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B. Does Hydrofracking Provide a Meaningful Economic Stimulus? 
Hydrofracking can prove immensely profitable to economically 
depressed areas, as struggling landowners receive a bounty for the 
extraction rights, and jobs pertaining to the operation flow into the 
area.156 Because the profits from leasing land for hydrofracking go 
entirely to the individual whose land is leased, and because the 
pollution costs associated with hydrofracking are borne by the entire 
surrounding community—a classic economic negative externality157—
individuals may lease their land for hydrofracking even when the 
costs to the community outweigh the benefits.158 However, because 
permitting hydrofracking can enable economically depressed areas 
(with sizeable natural-gas reserves) to realize infrastructure 
improvements, such as improved roads and new agricultural 
machinery,159 the negative externality often fails to be accounted for 
during the decision-making process. In the Marcellus region, in 2008 
alone, fracking operations were valued at $2.3 billion, estimated to 
have produced more than 29,000 jobs, and connected to a $240 
million increase in state and local tax revenue.160 As the number of 
sited wells increases,161 these benefits will undoubtedly increase as 
well. 
However, the economic benefits of hydrofracking are often 
overstated. First, a sizable portion of the money does not flow into 
the region: estimates show that only fifty-one percent of the land in 
the Marcellus is owned by local residents.162 Second, nearly forty 
 
 156.  Leasing a single acre can provide the landowner with $180,000 in royalties a year. 
Powers, supra note 2, at 927. 
 157.  An externality is a “consequence or side effect of one’s economic activity, causing 
another to benefit without paying or to suffer without compensation.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). More specifically, a negative externality is an “externality that is 
detrimental to another, such as water pollution created by a nearby factory.” Id. 
 158.  Pollution, or the possibility of pollution discounted by the percentage of its likelihood, 
is considered a negative externality because the social costs are far greater than the costs 
experienced by the individual making the decision. Because the rational landowner will 
theoretically lease his land up to the point where the benefit of leasing is greater than the cost of 
leasing to himself, the individual landowner does not necessarily consider the costs to others 
when making the decision, and therefore land may be leased for hydrofracking where the total 
costs (including social costs) exceed the benefits of the transaction. 
 159.  Boersma & Johnson, supra note 128, at 572. 
 160.  Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,332. 
 161.  See supra text accompanying notes 5–7. 
 162.  TIMOTHY W. KELSEY ET AL., MARCELLUS SHALE EDUC. & TRAINING CTR., 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MARCELLUS SHALE IN PENNSYLVANIA: EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME 
IN 2009 4 (2011), available at http://www.shaletec.org/docs/ 
EconomicImpactFINALAugust28.pdf#zoom=75 (“According to our analysis, approximately 51 
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percent of the workers used are not from the region.163 Third, existing 
socioeconomic separations are amplified due to hydrofracking 
because those who financially benefit from leasing their land can 
afford to relocate, leaving behind any potential environmental 
impacts or health hazards to their former neighbors who did not 
receive the financial windfall.164 
Fourth, rapid population and economic growth in “too short a 
time can prove disastrous.”165 According to the “boomtown” or 
“social disruption” model, as population flourishes, existing 
infrastructure is incapable of meeting demand for necessary public 
services, such as public schooling, retail inventories, housing, medical 
care, and even recreational opportunities required for a positive 
quality of life.166 The decreased quality of life leads to a dissatisfied 
workforce for hydrofracking operations or other local businesses, and 
the “social upheaval and malaise” leads to a decrease in private 
investment outside of the hydrofracking operation.167 Moreover, in 
small towns that are transforming into “natural gas towns,” local 
governments “seldom have adequate resources or the experienced 
staff required to research the issues that arise or preventatively 
allocate resources to deal with expected problems before they 
occur.”168 In fact, at “growth rates higher than 15%,” institutional 
breakdowns are described as “typical.”169 
 
percent of the land in Marcellus counties is owned by residents within the county, 25 percent is 
owned by someone living elsewhere in Pennsylvania, and 7.7 percent is owned by people living 
outside of Pennsylvania. The remaining 17 percent is owned by the public sector, primarily the 
Commonwealth.”). 
 163.  Boersma & Johnson, supra note 128, at 572. 
 164.  See Powers, supra note 2, at 928 n.161. (discussing how potential pollution can lead to 
the over-utilization of hydrofracking). 
 165.  Matthew T. Dubois, The Natural Gas Explosion: Boom of Bust for New York’s 
Economy and Environment? 8 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://law.buffalo.edu/ 
Academic_Programs_And_Research/submenu/conEvironLaw/dubois12.pdf. 
 166.  Jeffrey Jacquet, Energy Boomtowns & Natural Gas: Implications for Marcellus Shale 
Local Governments & Rural Communities 7 (The N.E. Reg’l Ctr. for Rural Dev., Working 
Paper No. 43, 2009), available at http://nercrd.psu.edu/Publications/rdppapers/rdp43.pdf. 
 167.  See Dubois, supra note 165, at 9 (“The social upheaval and malaise drives [off] private 
investors and prevents investment in commerce, housing, or other private sector needs. The 
inadequacy of public and private sector services feeds back into the cycle, degrading the quality 
of life and destabilizing the workforce, which leads in turn to a reduction in services.”). 
 168.  Id. at 9–10. 
 169.  Id. at 10. 
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Whereas the state profits from an increase in taxes,170 these 
boomtowns experience short-term economic benefits and subsequent 
recessions when the drilling construction phase is completed and the 
production phase, which requires much less labor and local resources, 
begins.171 These economic downturns are worsened by local 
investment predicated on the idea that the short-term economic 
benefits of hydrofracking will continue.172 In a 2009 Penn State 
University study, “[a]lmost all of the boomtown communities that 
were researched during [the] 1970s and early 1980s went through a 
severe economic downturn as the construction . . . was completed.”173 
The boom-and-bust cycle may be exacerbated in less gas-rich areas 
where the construction-withdrawal cycle is much shorter. 
On the other hand, the practice of hydrofracking has affected 
domestic energy prices,174 in part because the increased supply of gas 
is decreasing the demand for other fuel sources as industry begins to 
switch to natural gas as a power source. AT&T recently vowed to 
convert its 76,000-vehicle fleet to run on natural gas.175 Furthermore, 
many, including T. Boone Pickens, have suggested that hydrofracking 
can help lead the United States to energy independence, and 
therefore they support tax incentives for the conversion to natural gas 
vehicular infrastructure.176 
VI. WHICH GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY SHOULD REGULATE 
HYDROFRACKING 
A. Should Hydrofracking Regulation be Left to the States? 
Some argue that because hydrofracking is a localized activity 
with few interstate impacts, hydrofracking regulation should be 
 
 170.  See Gruza, supra note 77, at 10,332 (discussing hydrofracking’s relationship to 
increased state taxes in the Marcellus region). 
 171.  Dubois, supra note 165, at 11. 
 172.  See id. (discussing that local “investments are often predicated upon projected growth 
rates that make the erroneous assumption that the initial natural gas well construction phase 
will continue indefinitely”). 
 173.  Jacquet, supra note 166, at 24. 
 174.  Inflation adjusted U.S. electricity prices have dropped from approximately thirteen 
cents per kilowatt-hour in 1990 to just below twelve cents. See Inflation Adjusted Average U.S. 
Electricity Prices Graph, INFLATIONDATA.COM, http://inflationdata.com/articles/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/Inflation-Adjusted-Electricity.jpg (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
 175.  Leah Harnack, Ending our Oil Dependence, MASS TRANSIT (Nov. 23, 2010), 
http://www.masstransitmag.com/article/10207824/ending-our-oil-dependence. 
 176.  Id. 
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reserved for the states.177 For instance, as previously mentioned,178 
migration of gas into drinking water presents more risks in areas that 
are relatively water-rich, more geologically brittle, and have a higher 
degree of groundwater connectivity. Because states have differing 
geologies and needs, regulation is better left to the different states.179 
This argument is misguided for several reasons. 
First, whereas shale is relatively resistant to underground fluid 
migration,180 intrastate extraction can lead to interstate environmental 
problems, as pollutants flow downstream or seep into aquifers 
spanning multiple states.181 Pollutants can reach aquifers in multiple 
ways, such as through poorly designed water wells182 or via seismic 
activity that cracks pre-existing fault lines.183 Concerns with interstate 
pollution are heightened in regions with more groundwater 
connectivity and non-fracking-related seismic activity. Second, 
geologists are experts at rock formations and therefore, whether a 
geologist works for a given state or for the federal government, he or 
she will be equally capable at studying the land formations and 
deciding upon a proper baseline or minimum threshold that states can 
then build upon. Additionally, national standards do not necessarily 
need to be equivalent to one-size-fits-all regulation. For example, 
requirements could differ by rock permeability or by vertical distance 
from potable water. Third, although socioeconomic situations of 
states differ, because of the negative externalities associated with 
pollution and concerns regarding intertemporal decision-making, 
state legislation balancing short-term economic gains and long-term 
environmental costs will lead to suboptimal results. This topic is 
discussed in greater detail below.184 
 
 177.  See Powers, supra note 2, at 953 (calling hydrofracking a “land-based activity without 
any obvious interstate impacts”). 
 178.  See supra text accompanying notes 73–77. 
 179.  See Powers, supra note 2, at 954 (stating that “given the extensive private property 
interests involved in hydrofracking, local geographic, socioeconomic, geological, and 
hydrological differences make state regulation arguably more appropriate”). 
 180.  See supra text accompanying notes 95–98. 
 181.  For example, the Ogallala Aquifer spans eight states (South Dakota, Nebraska, 
Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas) and environmental groups 
have raised concern that hydrofracking could “jeopardizethe integrity of the Ogallala Aquifer,” 
on which many farmers depend. Tim Carpenter, Hydrofracking Exposes Controversy in Kansas, 
TOPEKA CAPITAL J. (Sept. 5, 2011, 2:06 PM), http://cjonline.com/news/2011-09-
05/hydrofracking-exposes-controversy-kansas. 
 182.  See supra text accompanying notes 104–106. 
 183.  See supra text accompanying note 134. 
 184.  This topic is discussed in greater detail infra Part VI.B. 
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Because many sectors of the oil and natural gas industry were 
exempted from environmental regulations with the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005,185 one could argue that the “Halliburton loophole” provides 
evidence that the federal government is incapable of comprehensive 
federal legislation. However, the federal government has proven 
capable of comprehensive federal environmental regulation before. 
The federal government already has sweeping environmental 
regulations in place, such as the CWA, SDWA, CAA, and CERCLA. 
For example, the EPA and Transportation Department already 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions for automobiles pursuant to the 
CAA.186 Because of methane’s potency as a greenhouse gas,187 the 
EPA should remove the natural gas industry’s exemption from the 
CAA aggregating policies,188 and aggregate emissions that occur from 
drilling operations. As California can set its own vehicular emissions 
standards, other states should similarly be waived from preemption if 
they wish to increase environmental protections.189 Furthermore, 
there is no reason why the environmental impacts of coal mining 
should be scrutinized more carefully by the federal government than 
those of natural gas exploration.190 
Moreover, the federal government’s previous failure to get 
involved in the hydrofracking debate is partly attributable to Dick 
Cheney’s actions as the chair of the national Energy Policy 
Development Group.191 If the federal government were to establish a 
comprehensive federal hydrofracking baseline in the future, one 
would hope that they would choose a person with a more neutral 
mindset to chair the task force. Because of the negative publicity 
afforded to the “Halliburton loophole,” it is unlikely that such a 
biased chair would be picked the second time around. With a more 
 
 185.  See supra Part III.A. 
 186.  John M. Broder, U.S. Issues Limits on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Cars, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/science/earth/02emit.html?_r=0. 
 187.  See supra text accompanying notes 122–128. 
 188.  See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 189.  In 2009, the EPA granted California “a waiver of Clean Air Act preemption to enforce 
its greenhouse gas emission standards” after the waiver was originally denied in 2005. California 
State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of 
Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744, 32,744 (July 8, 2009), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-07-08/pdf/E9-15943.pdf. 
 190.  See generally Strict Regulations Govern Coal Mining, AM. COAL FOUND., 
http://www.ket.org/trips/coal/agsmm/agsmmregs.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2013) (discussing the 
strict regulations governing coal mining). 
 191.  See supra text accompanying notes 21–27. 
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impartial chair, federal action will be less biased and more able to 
overcome the barriers preventing efficient state balancing of the 
tension between energy and environmental issues. 
Many gas-rich states, as well as gas-industry lobbyists, argue that 
state regulation is adequate because fracking operations have 
presented few problems and unnecessarily imposing federal 
regulation would burden the industry by increasing costs of 
permitting and slowing production.192 However, this argument ignores 
the potentially significant long-term environmental costs that come 
with hydrofracking. Whereas pollutants in small doses may do little 
harm, as pollutants aggregate, there may be a more cognizable, long-
term impact. Indeed, the EPA, in its most recent evaluation of 
hydrofracking in Pavillion, Wyoming in 2011, discussed previously, 
concluded that hydrofracking had led to pollution of the water 
supply—providing bona fide evidence that hydrofracking can 
contribute to environmental degradation. Because the EPA only 
made this conclusion very recently, other incidences of pollution will 
likely be attributed to hydrofracking in the coming years as more 
studies are conducted and pollution aggregates in the water supply. 
After all, the EPA’s stance on hydrofracking changed dramatically 
from 2004 (when the agency concluded that fracking posed little 
threat to the environment) to 2011 (when the EPA concluded that 
fracking had contaminated the Wyoming water supply). 
B. The Federal Government Should be the Entity Charged with Setting 
Baseline Standards 
Individuals have a strong tendency to discount heavily—and 
therefore undervalue—future outcomes when compared to 
immediate impacts.193 Intertemporal discounting has a strong impact 
on the clash between economic and environmental interests. In 
political elections, the immediacy of hydrofracking’s perceived 
economic impacts will lure political fervor when compared to the 
more nebulous environmental costs. For several reasons, the federal 
government will be better than other levels of government at 
 
 192.  MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT (SDWA): 
SELECTED REGULATED AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 24 (2010), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34201_20100727.pdf. 
 193.  See generally Dilip Soman et al., The Psychology of Intertemporal Discounting: Why 
are Distant Events Valued Differently from Proximal Ones?, 16 MARKETING LETTERS 347 
(2005), available at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/ShaneFrederick/Marketing%20Letters.pdf 
(discussing and explaining intertemporal discounting). 
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safeguarding against the problems of intertemporal and 
intergenerational decision-making. 
The federal environmental bureaucracy is farther removed from 
the electorate and therefore the federal government will be less 
pressured than local governments by the perceived economic benefits 
of specific drilling proposals. For example, in rural areas where the 
citizenry clamors for more drilling and less environmental regulation 
because of the perceived economic boost, local legislators will have 
little choice but to succumb to the population’s wishes if they desire 
reelection. This pressure will likely be felt even if hydrofracking 
operations pose a threat to the long-term economic health of an area, 
as suggested by the social disruption model.194 The federal 
government is more insulated from these pressures, because states 
more concerned with the environmental impacts of hydrofracking—
such as those posing statewide moratoriums—will provide support for 
environmental regulation. For example, congressional Democrats are 
currently pressuring the EPA to continue research on the connection 
between hydrofracking and water contamination.195 Having both sides 
of the issue heard will help buttress against bias in any direction. 
Whereas federal regulatory agencies are also susceptible to political 
pressure,196 the federal government will feel less pressure because of 
the political make-up of the legislature. Rasmussen reported that in 
August 2012, 37.6% of the United States identified as Republican and 
33.3% as Democrat,197 but many states tend to have political 
inclinations that are less balanced than the United States as a whole. 
In general, state and local governments are “particularly 
vulnerable to industry and union pressures.”198 Industrial interest 
groups, such as the energy companies supporting hydrofracking, tend 
to be more vocal than their counterparts because they have a large 
 
 194.  See supra text accompanying notes 165–81. 
 195.  John C. Rudolf, Pressure Grows for Answers on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2011), 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/02/pressure-grows-for-answers-on-fracking/. 
 196.  See e.g., Press Release, U.S. House of Rep. Energy & Commerce Committee, Facing 
Bipartisan Congressional Pressure, EPA Finally Clears Offshore Permits (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/facing-bipartisan-congressional-pressure-epa-
finally-clears-offshore-permits (announcing that the EPA finally conceded under bipartisan 
pressure and granted permits for exploration in Alaska’s Chukchi Sea after a five-year 
bureaucratic delay). 
 197.  Partisan Trends, RASMUSSEN REP. (Sept. 1, 2012), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/ 
public_content/politics/mood_of_america/partisan_trends. 
 198.  Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State 
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1213 (1977). 
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economic stake in any prescribed regulation, and therefore will be 
willing to spend significant amounts of money to avoid increased 
regulation or pollution-control costs.199 Those fighting for increased 
environmental regulation tend to have less of a monetary stake in the 
outcome, and therefore local government is likely to place less 
emphasis on environmental concerns. 
The disproportionate pressures felt by state and local 
governments are intensified because of a collective action problem—
opposition to environmental degradation is shared among the masses, 
with each individual having a small personal interest in environmental 
quality, and facing formidable transaction costs associated with 
expressing that interest. In contrast, industrial interest groups have 
large, concentrated interests, so coordination is less of a problem.200 
The “tragedy of the commons”201 from the field of economics and the 
“social loafing”202 phenomena from social psychology prescribe that 
individuals are less likely to act (or refrain from acting) when their 
individual actions would have a miniscule impact on the outcome of a 
larger group. For example, the aggregating effects of methane gas on 
climate change are experienced by everyone, but each individual 
fracturing operation has minimal costs to any particular individual on 
the margin. Over time, once all drilling operations are aggregated, the 
amount of methane in the atmosphere can have dramatic effects.203 
The federal government is the better entity to solve collective 
action problems because they are better shielded from strong local 
political pressures and have the ability to assess the entire nation’s 
present and future interests.204 The nexus between energy extraction 
 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
 201.  The tragedy of the commons “describes how individual actors are driven by short-term 
self-interest to pollute a commonly held resource even where each individual knows the group’s 
collective actions will eventually destroy or seriously damage it.” Powers, supra note 2, at 931. 
 202.  Social loafing is defined as “the tendency of individual group members to reduce their 
work effort as groups increase in size when performance is needed in a group.” J. DAN 
ROTHWELL, IN MIXED COMPANY: COMMUNICATING IN SMALL GROUPS 83 (3d ed. 1997). This 
applies to the hydrofracking context because the group of those that may be affected by the 
possible environmental impacts of hydrofracking are spread over the entire population, while 
those receiving a large profit from the fracturing operation are smaller in number. 
 203.  See supra text accompanying notes 126–128. Climate change may start having more 
noticeable impacts on society, as most of the models from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change project exponential growth patterns. INTERGOVT. PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 66–80 (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4_wg1_full_report.pdf. 
 204.  Powers, supra note 2, at 932. 
Garmezy (Do Not Delete) 5/7/2013 11:16 AM 
Spring 2013] BALANCING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING’S IMPACTS 433 
and environmental degradation is especially influenced by these 
economic and psychological phenomena because environmental 
concerns are less noticeable on the margin. In other areas, such as 
labor or social-welfare policies, those adversely affected by any pro-
industry regulations will have more of a voice, because cognizable 
effects will tend to be more clustered in urban areas (rather than rural 
areas as with hydrofracking) and employment and health concerns 
may be more relatable and invoke more empathy. Everyone might 
become sick or fall on hard times, but not everyone will be affected 
by the water quality in Pavillion, Wyoming or the diminution of 
pristine wilderness in Colorado. 
One of the major arguments in favor of federal regulation when 
environmental and industrial interests clash is the “race-to-the-
bottom” paradigm205—the theory that if the federal government fails 
to get involved, states will lower regulations in order to attract 
business inside their borders.206 Because states will be forced to 
compete, environmental regulations will be lowered to suboptimal 
levels.207 However, because hydraulic fracturing operations are not 
zero-sum, one might expect the “race-to-the-bottom” to have a 
smaller impact, if any, because rational companies will drill wherever 
the marginal revenue of the action exceeds the marginal cost—
wherever a profit can be made. The chief decisions regarding where 
to drill are (a) where is the gas located and (b) whether the gas can be 
extracted at a profit. 
Theoretical economics aside, empirical evidence suggests that 
state officials may unnecessarily lower standards to attract industry 
because of political pressure.208 Especially in a weak economy, or in 
any area experiencing some level of unwanted underemployment, the 
economy tends to be the most important political issue.209 As 
 
 205.  See Powers, supra note 2, at 932–33 (explaining that “[t]he ‘race-to-the-bottom’ 
paradigm has also been used to defend federal intervention in environmental issues.”). 
 206.  Id. at 933. 
 207.  One way to simplify the “race-to-the-bottom” problem in the hydrofracking context is 
to view each state as a perfect substitute for another state. If one state has lower environmental 
regulations, then it will be more profitable to drill there and that state will experience all of the 
economic benefits of hydrofracking. Because of this, states will continue to lower their 
regulation in order to avoid losing the economic benefits of hydrofracking. 
 208.  For a more in-depth discussion on the race-to-the-bottom, see generally Kirsten H. 
Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 
HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997). 
 209.  See, e.g., Joe V. Kanel, Exit Polls: Top Issues for Voters, CNN (Nov. 6, 2012, 7:43 PM), 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/06/exit-polls-top-issues-for-voters (describing that in 
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discussed above, the electorate is likely to favor short-term economic 
benefits compared to nebulous, long-term environmental costs. 
Moreover, pollution, which when aggregated can have severe 
impacts, can be hard to notice on the margin.210 
The “free-rider problem” also suggests that states might not 
factor in pollution costs that fall outside their borders (even if caused 
within the state), and therefore state governance worsens the 
pollution negative-externality. Examples of interstate pollutants are 
greenhouse gas emissions from fugitive methane and water 
contamination that can cross state lines. Therefore, current state 
legislators might feel more compelled to lower regulations out of fear 
of political backlash if the public perceives not doing so as unwanted 
inaction. The federal bureaucracy, in providing a regulatory baseline 
for all states, would be insulated from these pressures. 
Even in New York, a gas-rich state with relatively more 
regulations than its peers, hydrofracking faces “underprotection” due 
to inadequate enforcement capacity and “its failure to anticipate 
cumulative impacts.”211 For example, New York’s regulatory scheme 
has proven incapable of ensuring that fracking flowback is sufficiently 
clean to meet SDWA and RCRA requirements.212 Hydrofracking 
regulation should reside with the federal government because of its 
better ability to alleviate the “race-to-the-bottom” and collection-
action problems, and because if left to state governance, 
underprotection is likely (due to political trade-offs and cognitive 
barriers to more effective decision-making). Notably, the governor of 
Wyoming delayed the release of the EPA’s findings in the Pavillion 
study in order to “coordinate an ‘all-out-press’ against the EPA,”213 
suggesting that states are failing to adequately balance economic 
benefits and environmental costs. 
 
the 2012 presidential election, “early exit poll results [showed that] the economy [was] the 
number one issue on voter’s minds”). 
 210.  “Stock” pollution refers to the amalgamation of pollutants that the environment 
cannot readily absorb. With each additional pollutant, it will be hard to perceive the difference 
on the margin, however, amassing substantial pollutants can have severe impacts. See Kenneth 
R. Szulczyk, Lecture #5 – Pollution: Precautionary Principle, http://www.oocities.org/szulczyk/ 
lessons/environmental_05.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
 211.  See Powers, supra note 2, at 954 (explaining that “an analysis of New York’s 
experience with hydrofracking to date suggests that state primacy may well result in under-
protection and even hamper production activity”). 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Wyoming Pushed EPA to Delay Study on Fracking, supra note 94. 
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C. However, Local Governments Should Have the Ability to Zone Out 
Fracking 
Many municipalities and counties have decided to ban 
hydrofracking completely,214 and whether the local governments have 
the ability to do so legally depends on the state’s regulatory 
framework.215 For example, in 2011, Morgantown, West Virginia 
banned hydrofracking within a mile of city limits. However, this ban 
was struck down as being preempted by state law, as the industry is 
regulated exclusively by the West Virginia Department of 
Environmental Protection, which had issued a permit for the 
operation.216 
Currently, preemption battles are underway in New York as 
well,217 with New York’s lower courts, unlike those in West Virginia, 
tending to uphold municipal bans of hydrofracking. Proponents of 
preemption (that is, of preventing local fracking bans in New York) 
argue that “the [l]egislature’s intent [was] to streamline energy 
development in the state and protect the economic rights of property 
owners who seek to cash in on their underground natural 
resources.”218 However, supporters of a municipality’s ability to ban 
fracking argue that “the law preempts local governments from 
regulating how oil and gas companies operate”; the purpose is 
regulating the process to keep it safe, not to unilaterally decide where 
to drill.219 In 1987, the Court of Appeals of New York decided in Frew 
Run Gravel Products, Inc. v. Town of Carroll220 that “[s]tricter local 
standards” for mining activities “would be consistent with the 
statute’s over-all aim of protecting the environment.”221 Pursuant to 
the court’s decision in Frew Run, in Anschutz Exploration Corp. v. 
 
 214.  For example, in the Marcellus region, dozens of municipalities, including Buffalo, 
Ithaca, Geneva, Pittsburgh, and Cresson, have banned hydrofracking. Negro, supra note 53, at 
10. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  See generally N.E. Natural Energy, LLC v. Morgantown, WV, No. 11-c-411 
(Monongalia Cty. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (order granting summary judgment). 
 217.  For example, Dryden has passed zoning laws banning hydrofracking, but the ban is 
being contested in court. Negro, supra note 53, at 10. 
 218.  Peter Mantius, Dryden and Middlefield Fracking Bans Tested, D.C. BUREAU (Nov. 11, 
2011), http://www.dcbureau.org/201111116473/natural-resources-news-service/dryden-and-
middlefield-fracking-bans-tested.html. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  524 N.Y.S.2d 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987). 
 221.  Id. at 133. 
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Town of Dryden,222 a local court recently decided that the Town of 
Dryden, New York had the power to ban hydrofracking through 
zoning laws.223 Similarly, the Town of Middlefield’s ban of 
hydrofracking was upheld in Cooperstown Holstein Corp. v. Town of 
Middlefield,224 because New York’s supersession clause225 does not 
preempt a municipality from “enacting land use regulation within the 
confines of its jurisdiction.”226 Currently, some states with less clearly 
defined municipal roles are considering whether or not to pass 
legislation that would prohibit municipal banning of hydrofracking.227 
Many of these local battles over hydrofracking policy can be 
attributed to the fact that, with the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the 
federal government stepped away from hydrofracking regulation, 
leaving regulation over the majority of the drilling operation solely to 
the states. Federal governmental regulation could provide for 
municipal rights and grant local governments the legal authority to 
place moratoriums on hydrofracking. As discussed previously, many 
states may have implemented energy policies that fail to adequately 
balance the benefits of hydrofracking with the long-term 
environmental costs (for example, many states have failed to regulate 
fracking fluid containing diesel pursuant to the SDWA).228 Concern 
over hydrofracking’s environmental impacts is mounting, and the 
effects of a statewide failure to assess accurately the costs of 
hydrofracking should not be thrust upon unwilling municipalities. 
A frequent argument proffered for preemption, and against 
municipal control, is that providing municipalities with the power to 
zone-out hydrofracking will lead to NIMBYism.229 However, 
NIMBYism in the hydrofracking context is not necessarily bad, as the 
most likely effect would be to push hydrofracking away from more 
 
 222.  940 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
 223.  Id. at 474. 
 224.  943 N.Y.S.2d 722 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
 225.  N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 23-0303(2) (McKinney 2011) (“The provisions of this 
article shall supersede all local laws or ordinances relating to the regulation of the oil, gas and 
solution mining industries . . .”). 
 226.  Cooperstown Holstein, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 730. 
 227.  For example, Pennsylvania just passed legislation expressly preempting “local 
ordinances and enactments purporting to regulate oil and gas well operations regulated by this 
chapter.” S.B. 1100, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011); H.B. 1950, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011) 
 228.  See supra text accompanying notes 33–34. 
 229.  NIMBY stands for “not in my backyard; See Michael Burger, “It’s Not Easy Being 
Green”: Local Initiatives, Preemption Problems, and the Market Participant Exception, 78 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 835, 889 (2010) (describing NIMBYism as a common reason for preemption in the 
environmental context). 
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urban areas (which tend to have a more diversified economy) to more 
rural areas (which tend to have more of a resource-based economy 
and will therefore be more welcome to drilling operations).230 Using a 
purely utilitarian lens,231 if the benefits of hydrofracking are assumed 
similar in rural and urban areas,232 and there are assumed to be less 
pollution costs in rural areas because of the less dense population, 
then fracking would return more social profit in more rural areas. 
Municipalities in rural areas should be afforded this choice as well, 
and as long as the overwhelming majority does not decide to ban 
drilling (which is unlikely because many localities advocate for the 
economic impact of hydrofracking and more residents of New York 
currently support hydrofracking than oppose the practice),233 then 
America will not be thrust into a national energy crisis. After all, 
before the hydrofracking explosion began in 2006, hydrofracking did 
not constitute a major portion of domestic energy production. 
Nevertheless, local governments are unlikely to have a significant 
effect on the national energy supply, as the majority of rural regions 
are unlikely to zone-out hydrofracking completely, and therefore 
natural gas will still be injected into the national energy supply. 
Furthermore, one of the main benefits attributed to 
hydrofracking, localized economic growth, will not come to fruition if 
a municipality decides to zone out hydrofracking. If a municipality 
conducts its own cost-benefit analysis, and decides that the estimated 
costs are higher than the estimated benefits, then the municipality 
should have the power to ban hydrofracking. If the municipality views 
the fracturing operation as a net loss, then there is no localized 
economic benefit accrued—economic concerns encompass more than 
 
 230.  See Powers, supra note 2, at 946 n.204 (describing that in the natural gas context, 
zoning “provides a limited tool” and that most fracking will “occur in rural, rather than 
municipal areas”). 
 231.  It is important to note that utilitarianism should not be used as the only consideration, 
regulators and decision makers should also consider environmental justice and socioeconomic 
concerns. 
 232.  This is an over-simplification as the benefits will depend on factors going to the 
profitability of the well, such as the amount of the resource being extracted and the ease of 
extraction. 
 233.  See, e.g., Associated Press, Poll: More Support Hydrofracking than Oppose in NY, 
PRESSCONNECTS.COM (Dec. 6, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://www.pressconnects.com/viewart/ 
20121206/NEWS10/312060032/Poll-more-support-hydrofracking-than-oppose-NY (last visited 
Dec. 10, 2012) (finding that in New York, “42 percent support hydrofracking” and another “36 
percent oppose it”). 
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mere monetary concerns.234 Accordingly, municipalities should have 
more tools and should be able to increase environmental regulation 
(on top of what is mandated at the state or federal level). After all, 
some of “the most sophisticated and effective regulations of shale 
drilling” have been implemented by local governments.235 
Consequently, municipalities should be vested with the power to 
regulate noise and light pollution.236 This would allow hydrofracking 
to occur, while helping to mitigate the pollution externality. All of the 
arguments favoring stronger municipal regulation apply equally to 
state governments. 
VII: CONCLUSION: ENFORCEMENT MUST ALSO BE IMPROVED 
Drafting comprehensive federal hydrofracking regulations is not 
the only step required to mitigate the environmental impacts and 
health concerns associated with hydrofracking. Enforcement must 
also be increased. The Penn Environment Research and Policy 
Center discovered that “of the 4,596 fracking sites operating in 
Pennsylvania between 2008 and 2011, companies violated 
environmental laws 3,355 times.”237 Because the fines are not 
substantial enough to act as an effective deterrent, companies view 
them as a simple business expense, leaving landowners to suffer the 
“decimated property values,” polluted air, and contaminated water 
left behind after a violation.238 In fact, having fines that are too small 
might actually increase the undesirable behavior. Having the fine 
takes the framing of the decision out of a moral setting and into 
 
 234.  See generally Peter Lewin, Pollution Externalities: Social Cost and Strict Liability, 2 
CATO J. 205 (1982), http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache: 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj2n1/cj2n1-6.pdf (describing “the neoclassical social-cost 
approach to problems of pollution.”). 
 235.  Reser & Ritter, supra note 34, at 34. Various municipalities in Texas have regulated 
“setbacks, well locations, green completions, closed loops systems, compressor locations, 
pipelines, waste disposal, truck traffic and noise regulation.” Id. 
 236.  For example, Collier Township in Pennsylvania sets minimum ambient noise levels 
dependent on the time of day and the stage of the operation. 
Prior to the commencement of Oil or Gas Well drilling activities, or in the case of 
other mineral removal, the actual commencement of mining activity, no construction 
activities involving excavation of, alteration to or repair work on any access road to the 
site of the mineral removal or upon an Oil or Gas Well site, other site of mineral 
removal, shall be performed during the hours of 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. 
COLLIER TOWNSHIP, PA., ORDINANCE 592 § 1703.29.r (2011). 
 237.  Frances Beinecke, Fracking Operations Run Roughshod over Pennsylvania 
Homeowners, NRDC STAFF BLOG (Sept. 26, 2012), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/ 
blogs/fbeinecke/fracking_operations_run_roughs.html. 
 238.  Id. 
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monetary one, which may cause a corporation to engage in a cost-
benefit analysis, and when the fines are too small, decrease 
environmental compliance.239 Because the energy industry titans are 
not often looked upon as moral bastions, larger monetary fines or 
criminal sanctions, depending on the violation, should be imposed.240 
 
 
 239.  For example, in a study conducted in Haifa, Israel, economists found that the 
occurrence of parents picking up their children late more than doubled once a small monetary 
fine was imposed for tardiness. For the study, see Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a 
Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). 
 240.  If no fines were in place, it is unlikely that morals would effectively govern 
hydrofracking without any form of tangible penalties. 
